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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEROLDENE BAYLES, nka 
JEROLDENE BAILEY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant/ 
Petitioner, 
vs 
RANDEE BAYLES, 
Defendant/Appellee, 
Respondent 
Case No 980347-CA 
Priority No 10 
REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner, Jeroldene Bailey, relies on her opening brief and refers this 
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, standards of review, 
cases and facts1 Petitioner responds to Respondent answer to her opening brief 
as follows 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The threshold requirement for a modification is a showing of a substantial 
change of circumstances occurring since the entry of the divorce decree 
Randee's allegations all involve activity that occurred prior to the entry of the 
'There is an error in Petitioner's opening brief, at page 3, fn 1 which 
indicated that Douglas Terry Esq, entered his first appearance by way of 
Petitioner's Motion to Bifurcate Terry entered his appearance on April 4, 1997 
by signing a substitution of counsel (R 22) 
divorce decree. Thus, his contention that he is entitled to a hearing to determine if 
any wrongdoing occurred, and if it did, whether it had been litigated, must fail 
(Appellee's Brief at 14-15). 
Randee's allegation that the Motion to Dismiss procedurally blocked his 
ability to show a change of circumstances is disingenuous (Appellee's Brief at 
15). Although he submitted a written response to the Motion to Dismiss, he never 
requested a hearing. 
Randee attempts to justify his lack of diligence by claiming that it was 
Jeroldene's fault, because she withheld documents (Appellee's Brief at 16). This, 
however, is not supported by the facts. By entering the stipulated property 
settlement, Randee abandoned his right to enforce discovery and to pursue any 
issues that he was concerned about. Likewise, Randee abandoned his right to 
set aside the judgment because he failed to act diligently, within the three-month 
time period, although he continued his "investigation" during this same time 
•period. 
POINT 1 
RESPONDENT HAD A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE THE MATTER 
(Reply to Point 1 of Appellee's Brief) 
A critical issue in determining the applicability of res judicata is whether the 
parties had "a fair opportunity to present and have determined [all of the issues]." 
Throckman v. Throckman, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In Jacobson v. Jacobson, 703 P.2d 303 (Utah 1985), the ex-husband 
2 
("Jacobson") filed an independent action against his second wife, claiming that 
she induced him to sign a property settlement in their divorce, based on the 
promise that she would reconvey his one-half interest in a parcel of land. Id. at 
304. 
There, while Jacobson was still married to his second wife, his first wife 
sought a judgment against him. Id. Prior to that judgment being entered, 
Jacobson conveyed his interest in a parcel of property to his second wife (that he 
and his second wife held in joint tenancy). Id. The understanding was that once 
the litigation with his first wife was resolved, his second wife would reconvey that 
interest back to him. Id. 
That same parcel of property became the subject of another suit during his 
second marriage, but Jacobson was dismissed as a party based on his 
representation that he had no interest in that property. Id. That litigation was 
dismissed and his second wife retained the parcel. Id. 
Jacobson and his second wife were subsequently divorced and a decree 
was entered based on a stipulated property settlement wherein the second wife 
retained that same parcel of property. Id. 
Jacobson then brought the independent action and the trial court dismissed 
his claim based on the lack of good faith and upon the grounds of res judicata. Id. 
at 304. 
3 
In applying the doctrine of res judicata, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned 
that Jacobson "had knowledge of the situation for a considerable amount of time, 
both before and after the divorce." Id. The Court noted that Jacobson stipulated 
to the divorce settlement and that he disclaimed any interest in the property in a 
civil action which occurred prior to the divorce. Id. The Court ultimately held that 
his claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata: 
Mr. Jacobson . . . argues that res judicata does not 
apply, and that he has properly brought an independent 
action to attack the divorce decree because he had no 
reason to suspect that Mrs. Jacobson would not convey 
an interest to him until September 1981. We, however, 
agree with the trial judge that the doctrine of res judicata 
does bar the action . . . We have said:.. .[wjhen there 
has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to 
those issues which were either tried and determined, or 
upon all issues which the party had a fair opportunity to 
present and have determined in the other proceeding. 
[citation omitted]. 
Id. at 305 (emphasis added). 
In the case at hand, Randee had a fair opportunity to address this alleged 
secreting of assets.2 The May 7th letter contained his allegation that the 
corporation had been drained of assets and his acknowledgment that he did not 
have all of the necessary information: 
The upshot of this is that the corporation has been 
drained of assets, which we believe should be 
This is not to concede or even suggest that there is any truth to Randee's 
allegations. 
4 
accounted for and an adjustment made in the settlement 
. . . At the current time we do not have all of the 
necessary information with regard to necessary 
adjustments. 
(R. 106). 
In that same letter, Randee threatened to compel discovery (R. 106). 
Based on the suspicions set forth in this letter, Randee had an obligation to 
address those suspicions beginning with the pretrial process of discovery and/or 
before any stipulation was entered. 
The parties then entered into a stipulated property settlement (R. 41). This 
stipulation, after being signed by all parties, was accepted and entered by the trial 
court and incorporated into the divorce decree (R. 56). 
There was an "investigation" during the three-month interlocutory period3 
after the final judgment was entered insofar as Randee subpoenaed his ex-wife's 
personal banking records in July, 1997 (R. 100). Yet, there was no follow-up. 
That Randee failed to diligently pursue any one of those avenues does not mean 
that he did not have a fair opportunity to litigate the issue. 
Randee's argument that Jeroldene's "failure" to put the documents "'on the 
table' in the property settlement and the withholding of the financial information 
constitutes fraud," prevented him from having a fair opportunity to litigate the 
3This interlocutory period simply refers to the three-month period when a 
party can set aside a judgement under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules Civil Procedure. 
Here, the three month period began June 17, 1997 when the Order in Re: Divorce 
Settlement was entered by the Court (R. 56). 
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issue ignores entirely his role in the adversarial process (Appellee's Brief at 16). 
Rather than placing himself at the mercy of the opposing party in an adversarial 
proceeding, he had the absolute right, if not obligation, to compel discovery 
and/or to refuse to sign a stipulation unless and until that matter was resolved. 
Randee's argument that the Motion to Dismiss was premature because, at 
a minimum, he was entitled to a hearing to determine if (1) any wrongdoing 
occurred and if it did, (2) whether it had been litigated, should also fail (Appellee's 
Brief at 14). Randee responded to the Motion to Dismiss, but he never 
requested a hearing on that motion (Appellee's Brief at 12). Thus, this argument 
should be rejected as waived. 
During the interlocutory period, Randee subpoenaed Jeroldene's personal 
bank records (R. 100). During the three-month interlocutory period when he 
subpoenaed Jeroldene's personal records, he had several options, including, but 
not limited to, a motion for order to show cause (for the alleged failure to return 
•the business records) or a motion to set aside the judgment. The only action ever 
taken during the interlocutory period was the withdrawal of Randee's counsel (R. 
63). 
Thus, like Jacobson, Randee had "ample opportunity" to litigate his 
allegations. Jacobson, 703 P.2d at 305. Like Jacobson, Randee had 
knowledge before the divorce and immediately after the divorce. Id. Finally, like 
Jacobson, Randee, knew that at the time that he entered into the stipulated 
6 
property settlement, he knew the ownership of the marital property was being 
determined. Id. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM IS NOT PROPERLY 
BROUGHT IN A PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
(Reply to Point 2 of Appellee's Brief) 
Randee relies heavily on Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298 (Utah 
1952)(Appellee's Brief at 15-16). There, the Utah Supreme Court allowed the 
reopening of a stipulated property settlement based on the fact that the husband 
fraudulently induced his wife to not raise an issue in the divorce settlement. Id. 
Randee however, wholly fails to demonstrate how he was induced by 
Jeroldene to sign the stipulation. His suggestion that he did this because of 
reliance on her promise that she would return records is not supported by the 
record (Appellee's Brief 16 ). 
In addition, aside from accusing Jeroldene of engaging in deceitful and 
unethical behavior, Randee's personally attacks her counsel4: 
4
 Randee contends that the behavior of the Jeroldene's attorneys were 
parallel to that of the attorney's behavior in Christensen v. Christensen, 619 P.2d. 
1372, 1374 (Utah 1980): 
Shortly before the trial below, plaintiff's counsel served 
upon defendant's counsel a written demand for him to 
produce at trial all books, records and check records 
relating to the income of the defendant for the year 
1978. Defendant's counsel does not deny that he 
agreed that he would produce them at trial without the 
necessity of a subpoena duces tecum being served 
7 
Randee requested personally5 and through counsel that 
the records be turned over. Both attorneys Reilly and 
Terry agreed to provide them without the necessity of 
formal discovery, but never did . . . The failure to provide 
the records prevented Randee from effective access to 
the courts. 
(Appellee's Brief at 21). 
This claim should be ignored because Randee does not, as he cannot, cite to the 
record to show that either counsel behaved in that manner. It is simply untrue. 
upon his client. At trial, however, the requested 
documents were not produced and while the defendant 
admitted the existence of them, he was allows by the 
trial court to testify concerning his 1978 income and 
expenses over objection of plaintiff counsel. 
Since the plaintiff was endeavoring also to establish a 
change of financial circumstances upon which a 
modification of the alimony provisions of the original 
decree could be made, we hold that this conduct on the 
part of the defendant was unjustified and resulted in 
prejudicial error to the plaintiff in that she was unable to 
pursue her claim for modification. 
Id. at p. 1373 (See, Appellee's Brief at 20-21) 
5lf Randee indeed personally requested the documents, a statement that is 
not supported by the record, he would have violated the Order to Show Cause 
wherein he was prohibited from contact with Jeroldene (R. 20). In addition, this 
again is another attempt to disparage Jeroldene's counsel because the ethical 
rules clearly prohibit an attorney from discussing matters with the opposing party, 
where that party is represented by counsel. See generally, Rule 4.2, Utah Rules 
of Professional Conduct. 
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POINT III 
A PETITION FOR MODIFICATION IS BASED ON A CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE ENTRY OF THE DECREE 
(Reply to Point Three of Appellee's Brief) 
The threshold requirement for a modification is a showing of a substantial 
change of circumstances since the entry of the divorce. See generally, Naylor v. 
Naylor 700 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985). All of Respondent's allegations deal with 
incidents and circumstances which occurred prior to the divorce. 
Randee's claim that "[i]t wasn't until after the decree was entered that [he] 
became aware" of the secreting of assets is flatly contradicted by the May 7th 
letter (Appellee's Brief 16). It is further complicated by the fact that he ostensibly 
had to suspect that something was amiss based on his decision to subpoena his 
ex-wife's personal banking records after the divorce was final.6 
Again the May 7th letter, shows that not one the allegations involved 
circumstances occurring after the entry, therefore any allegation that these 
circumstances constitute a substantial change in circumstances is totally 
baseless. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO DILIGENTLY PURSUE HIS REMEDIES 
IS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO PETITIONER'S FRAUD. 
(Reply to Point Four of Appellee's Brief) 
The final judgment was entered on June 17, 1997 and the subpoena was 
issued on July 22, 1997 (R. 56, 101). 
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Randee places a great deal of emphasis on Jeroldene's alleged failure to 
provide documents as denying him his day in court. He attempts to justify his 
failure to diligently pursue his remedies as Jeroldene's fraud. The Court should 
reject based on the fact that at all times, Randee was represented by counsel and 
had remedies that he either chose to ignore or disregard. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that trial court's 
denial of Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss be reversed. 
DATED this O^ day of February/ 
VYpA LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Rosalie Reilly 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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